This paper studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period's capital income tax rate. We find that the properties of optimal fiscal policy in this case differ dramatically from those of the full commitment solution. In particular, (i ) capital income tax rates are very high (65% on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment) and (ii ) labor income taxes are rather low on average (about 12% versus a value of around 31% under full commitment) and nearly as volatile as capital income taxes (a coefficient of variation of about .25 that under full commitment is essentially zero).
Introduction
The properties of optimal taxation in the growth model under full commitment are well understood. The seminal ideas of Ramsey (1927) were first applied to the growth model by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) , who showed that capital income should not be taxed in a deterministic steady state. Following up on these results, Zhu (1992) and Kehoe (1994, 1995) characterized optimal taxation in the context of the stochastic growth model. Stockman (1998) studied the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model in the presence of a balanced budget constraint. All of these authors assumed that the government can commit itself to the policies that will be in place arbitrarily far into the future. This assumption is an important one given the time-inconsistency of the policies that turn out to be optimal.
It is generally recognized that no actual government has access to a perfect commitment technology. This leaves us with two plausible approaches to analyzing optimal fiscal policy. One is to find mechanisms that might substitute for commitment. Several such mechanisms have been discussed in the literature. In a model without capital, Lucas and Stokey (1983) showed how to render the optimal fiscal policy time-consistent through a suitable choice of maturity structure for public debt. Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987) used nominal debt in order to make optimal monetary policy timeconsistent. Finally, Chari and Kehoe (1990) showed how to use reputational mechanisms such as trigger strategies that may substitute for commitment in a fully-fledged stochastic growth model.
The alternative possibility, the one we explore in this paper, is to see what optimal fiscal policy looks like when no commitment technology is available and mechanisms that substitute for commitment are inoperative. The way to do this is to force the government to base its policy on fundamentals only. Formally, this means that we focus on the properties of Markov perfect equilibria, which are time-consistent by construction. We contrast the properties of these Markov perfect equilibria with those of an economy where everything is the same except that the government can commit itself into the infinite future. We find dramatic differences between these two economies.
The main contribution of the present paper is to provide a quantitative treatment 1 of the positive theory of factor taxation. In doing this, it turns out that we can account for the order of magnitude of empirical capital income taxes even in the absence of any heterogeneity in the wealth distribution. We also give a quantitative assessment of how various constitutional aspects affect the equilibrium level of factor income tax rates.
The main reason for focusing on Markov equlibria as opposed to the entire set of subgame perfect equilibria is that it that the Markov restriction on strategies is an intuitively appealing refinement. It is appealing to some extent in all environments because it picks out those equilibria that put the smallest demands on the ability of agents to process information. Also, it captures the inuitive notion that bygones are bygones. Agents use only the information that is payoff relevant and do not take into account aspects of history that matter only because other agents also take them into account.
Precluding trigger strategies is particularly appealing in our environment, because successive governments share the same objectives. The only reason they disagree is that they are differently situated with respect to the incentive effects of taxation. This makes the idea that a current government should punish its predecessor by selecting a bad continuation equilibrium seem slightly odd.
No doubt, some readers will not find this defense of the Markov restriction compelling; one may plausibly insist that non-Markov equilibria are appealing even in the present environment because they capture the idea of maintaining a reputation. Nevertheless, even if one should want to study non-Markov equilibria, the Markov equilibrium is an excellent starting point. In particular, if one wants to calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium that is best in some sense, the problem is simplified enormously if one can establish an appropriate sustaining threat, i.e. what continuation equilibrium agents switch to after a deviation. One can then apply the method of Marcet and Marimon (1995) in order to give a recursive representation of the equilibrium.
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The optimal threat, presumably, is to switch to the worst possible continuation equilibrium. But it is not clear that this would be credible. In particular, a continuation (if there is one) that is worse than the Markov equilibrium is not very plausible. Intuitively, it seems that one could always agree to forget the past and start anew. But forgetting the irrelevant aspects of the past is precisely what the Markov restriction means.
2,3
The notion of Markov perfect equilibrium is defined and defended in Maskin and Tirole (1993) as well as in and Mailath and Samuelson (1998) . Krusell, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (1996) , , and Krusell, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (1997) made operational the notion of Markov perfect equilibrium in a growth model setting and used this to study environments with heterogeneous agents and with policies being set by majority vote.
4
Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption that the government cannot issue debt. The main motivation for this is a practical one; it turns out that there are some theoretical and numerical problems associated with the calculation of optimal policies in the absence of full commitment when we allow for government surpluses and deficits. Imposing a balanced budget constraint enables us to focus sharply on the consequences of relaxing the assumption of full commitment without having to deal with these rather difficult problems. In any case, as the work of Stockman (1998) showed, limits on the possibility of the government to run surpluses and deficits have no dramatic effects on the optimal policies when there is commitment.
In the full commitment case, we assume, as did Chari et al. (1994) , that the capital income tax rate in the initial period is inherited from the past. In the case without full commitment, we proceed analogously, letting the capital income tax rate be inherited from the past in every period. As in Chari et al. (1994) , our motivation for this assumption is to avoid the rather trivial possibility of lump-sum taxation. It also has 2 Phelan and Stacchetti (1999) suggest that some sort of renegotiation-proofness argument should apply in this sort of context, but don't attempt a precise formulation of it. As a substitute, they impose an arbitrary upper limit on capital income tax rates.
3 In this point we are abstracting from the possible role of Markov equilibria placed to the right of the peak of the Laffer curve.
4 In a representative agent setting, Ambler and Paquet (1996) look at the dynamics of beneficial government spending over the business cycle when it is set by a benevolent government under complete discretion.
3 the added advantage of facilitating comparisons with their work.
As we have stressed already, the optimal policies in the absence of full commitment are very different from those under full commitment. In particular, (i ) the tax rates on capital are 65 percent on average under the benchmark parameterization (under full commitment they are close to zero on average), and (ii ) labor income taxes are rather low on average (about 12% versus a value of around .31 under full commitment) and nearly as volatile as capital income taxes (a coefficient of variation of about .25 that under full commitment is essentially zero) Not surprisingly, we have found that the specification of the constitution matters for the equilibrium. In the baseline constitution, (contingency plans for) capital tax rates are committed to one year in advance. If instead the commitment period is two years, the average capital income tax is 48 percent.
Even apparently minor changes to the constitution may matter a lot. In particular, whether the commitment of the current government to previous government choices is through respecting a capital income tax rate or a labor income tax rate (both in the presence of a balanced budget constraint) changes the steady state capital income tax rate from 65 to 77 percent. This paper has several forebears. In the first place, there is the literature that deals with optimal taxation under commitment that was discussed above. Secondly, there is the literature on time-consistent policies. Both Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) noted that a large class of optimal policies (like the ones studied by Chari et al. (1994) and Stockman (1998) ) are time inconsistent. In addition to pointing to the time inconsistency of optimal policies, Kydland and Prescott (1977) also discussed the notion of a time-consistent equilibrium and how to calculate it in a useful appendix that only relatively recently has received the attention it deserves.
In related work, Chang (1998) studies a monetary model and Phelan and Stacchetti (1999) look at an optimal taxation problem using the ideas of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) . The analysis there is designed to characterize the entire set of subgame perfect equilibria (not only the Markov ones), and the results are limited to some qualitative long-run properties. Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) consider a very 4 similar environment to ours to study optimal taxation without commitment, but use a different solution concept, as described in footnote 1 above.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out the model, and in section 3 we describe the Ramsey equilibrium of the economy with commitment, where we state the problem in primal form in the sense of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) , as applied in Lucas and Stokey (1983) , Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991) and Stockman (1998) . In section 4 we describe the details of the economy without commitment and the notion of Markov perfect equilibrium that we use. Section 5 describes the calibration of the model economies that we study, while section 6 describes our findings with respect to the properties of the optimal fiscal policies and the associated equilibrium allocations. It also includes a discussion of some properties of the constitutional arrangement in shaping the tax policies that are actually implemented. Section 7 concludes. An Appendix describes our computational methods.
The model
The model is a standard stochastic growth model with a government sector driven by a Markov process for useless government purchases g and for total factor productivity z. Both the support of government purchases and total factor productivity is finite. Let the set of pairs of possible shocks be denoted by s ∈ S, a set with n elements.
Moreover, let Γ be its transition matrix with Γ ss denoting the probability of the shock being s tomorrow conditional on being s today. We write s t to denote a particular realization in period t and s t = {s 0 , . . . , s t } is a particular history. By some slight abuse of notation we write Γ(s t ) to denote the unconditional probability of history s t .
There is a representative consumer with standard preferences over streams of consumption and leisure that can be written as 
A policy π is a stochastic process π = {θ (s t ) , τ (s t )} for capital and labor income tax rates. Given π we can define a balanced budget competitive equilibrium. 
)] and (iii) the government satisfies its period by period budget constraint (4).
Throughout, we letter subscripts denote partial derivatives; e.g. F k is marginal productivity of capital. A balanced budget Ramsey equilibrium is a balanced budget equilibrium where (1) is maximized by the choice of π over the set of all such equilibria.
The simplest way to find the equilibrium is to use the primal approach to optimal taxation, as described in Chari and Kehoe (1998) . This involves stating the constraints in terms of allocations alone, with no explicit reference to prices or tax rates. As it turns out, the characterization of the equilibrium allocations under balanced budget rules is slightly different than those without such a constraint. The specific result proved by Stockman (1998) is as follows.
Proposition 1 The primal statement of the balanced budget Ramsey problem is to maximize (1) subject to
(5)
for all s t , and given k 0 and θ 0 .
Proof. See Stockman (1998) .
Note that equation (5) is the usual feasibility constraint that also appears in the standard Ramsey problem, (the one without the balanced budget constraint). This constraint applies at every node. Equation (6), on the other hand, is a constraint specific to economies with a balanced budget constraint. Note that in the way that it is written it also implies the implementability constraint of the standard Ramsey problem, and embodies a form of the intertemporal Euler equation of the individual agents. This constraint also has to be satisfied at every node (date-event).
The balanced budget Ramsey equilibrium in a deterministic version of the growth model has some of the same properties as the standard Ramsey equilibrium, namely 7 that in the long run, 5 capital should not be taxed. Formally we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The Ramsey optimal allocation under a balanced budget rule has the property that capital accumulation is undistorted in the long run of the deterministic version of this economy.
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from requiring all variables to be constant in the first order condition for capital accumulation.
A recursive formulation of the problem is needed to solve for the balanced budget Ramsey equilibrium numerically. Even with the aid of Proposition 1 there are two approaches to do this. The direct approach involves having as state variables the marginal utility of consumption and the state of nature in the previous period, and the stock of capital newly available, and then to solve for consumption, labor and investment simultaneously in all states of nature. This approach allows for the use of standard dynamic programming. However, it is quite cumbersome as a computational problem. We follow instead the alternative approach described in Marcet and Marimon (1995) . They define the state space via (s, k, η) , where η is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (6). This allows us to solve for consumption, labor input and investment in each state independently, a much simpler problem computationally. The functional equation associated to this approach is not, however, a standard maximization problem, but takes the form of a recursive Lagrangian. So stated, standard methods can be used to solve this problem. Once we obtain a solution, we back out the associated tax rates by using the first order conditions of the household's problem and the government budget constraint. We then generate time series of all relevant variables and study their properties. We turn next to the study of the economy without commitment.
The economy without commitment
To characterize the economy without commitment we have to be precise about who chooses what when. We repeat the one-period commitment to a capital income tax rate feature that was present in the first period of the economy with commitment, although this time it will be in place every period. More precisely, each period the government inherits a commitment to a certain capital income tax rate θ and observes the current realization of the stochastic shocks. Then it sets a vector of state contingent capital income tax rates (in the sense that it can make them depend on the realization of the shocks one period later) that the next period's government has to honor. Then the private sector moves, choosing how much to work and save. Finally, the labor income tax rate is determined so as to balance the budget. We allow tax rates to be state contingent in order to ensure that the degree of commitment is the only difference between the two economies that we study.
As we discussed above we will focus on the properties of Markov perfect equilibria.
We follow here the approach stated in a political economy context by , Krusell et al. (1996) and which is also related to that in Kydland and Prescott (1977) . The minimal aggregate state vector is the current realization of the shocks, s = {g, z}, the aggregate stock of capital, K, and the inherited tax rate θ. For notational simplicity we refer to the aggregate state vector as x = {g, z, K, θ}. For individual agents there is an additional state variable, individual capital, k. Next, we characterize the behavior of an economy with an arbitrary law of motion for the capital income tax rate θ given by θ(s ) = ψ(x).
This should be interpreted as giving the capital income tax rate for next period if shock s occurs given that todays state is x. In this world an individual agent solves the following problem
subject to
Note that we have indexed the value function as well as some other functions by ψ; this just reminds us that function ψ is completely exogenous at this stage (although it will not be later), and therefore the objects in the above problem vary when ψ varies.
In order to solve the problem the household needs to know functions {D K , D H , φ}. These functions will be determined in the economic equilibrium by the standard representative agent conditions and by the balanced budget condition. Equation (8) is the individual agent budget constraint, equation (9) is the aggregate law of motion of capital, equation (10) determines aggregate employment, equation (11) gives the labor income tax rate today and equation (12) gives the set of state contingent capital income tax rates for tomorrow. Finally, we take r(z, K, H) and w(z, K, H) to be expressions for the rental prices of factors. (x, k; ψ) denote the solution to (7). We are now ready to define an equilibrium for a given policy function ψ.
Definition 2 A recursive (stationary) economic equilibrium for policy rule ψ is a set of functions {v
(ii) The agent is representative, i.e.,
(iii) The government satisfies the budget constraint
We will now consider what it is optimal for the benevolent government to do in the current period, given that its successors will all follow policy ψ. We begin by defining the aggregate value function, i.e. the function used by the benevolent government to assess welfare, via
The next step is to determine the policy function ψ. For this we have to do the thought experiment that governments carry out when assessing different policy alternatives. The current government chooses the following period's state contingent capital income tax rates. It also sets the current period labor income tax rate as long as it balances the budget, which means that it has no real control over τ directly. Indirectly, however, it does. The government can affect it via its choice of the following period capital income tax rate, since this affects the return on savings, and hence the choices of households, in particular the labor choice. This means that it can affect the necessary current period tax rate needed to balance the budget.
Some expectations of future policy choices are required in order to assess current policies. We assume that the government correctly assumes that after next period, polices revert to be chosen according to the policy rule ψ. Let's define the problem of an agent under arbitrary, state contingent, capital income tax rates tomorrow given by θ := {θ(s )} s ∈S , and after that we revert to the economic equilibrium described above. Then
A few things are important to note. One is that, in the next period, the economy reverts to the economic equilibrium associated to the function ψ. Another is that we have marked a few functions with hats. This is because even though they play the same role as their no-hats counterparts above, they are indeed different as they are the result of agents actions under the expectations that capital income taxes are set to θ rather than to whatever is prescribed by the function ψ. We next define intermediate equilibrium as the equilibrium that results from making the solutions to problem (17) consistent with the functions that the agents take as given. Obviously, these functions satisfy the property that (ii) The agent is representative, i.e.,
¿From the individual value function of the intermediate equilibrium we get an aggregate value function capable of assessing alternative policies for the next period when policies after that are given by ψ. The aggregate value function is
Now what the benevolent government that expects other governments to use ψ does is to solve
At this point it should be clear that the political equilibrium is characterized by the condition that when the benevolent government expects future governments to follow a certain policy, then it prefers that same policy. Clearly, this is a fixed point problem. Formally, then, we have 
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An important thing to note is how the minimal state vector requirement implied by the notion of Markov perfect equilibria rules out any type of equilibria of the type that tries to use trigger strategies to enforce lower capital taxation. Imagine that we tried to construct such an equilibrium involving a strategy that prescribed a punitive capital income tax rate if the inherited tax rate deviated from some given low level (say, that prescribed by the Ramsey equilibrium). If the current benevolent government were to believe that its successor will apply such a strategy, then the current government would presumably choose the given low tax rate. However, for such a trigger strategy to form part of an equilibrium, governments need more information than the Markov assumption allows. In particular, governments need to be able to distinguish between the initial (exogenous) inherited tax rate and that chosen by a deviating predecessor. Moreover, in order for the prescribed punishing behavior to be optimal, governments must also be able to distinguish between a deviating predecessor and a punishing predecessor. Otherwise, punishment behavior cannot be rewarded without rewarding deviations as well. 
Calibration
We now describe the class of economies that we study. They are for the most part standard in the literature. Later, we discuss what are the parameters that make a difference quantitatively. Unlike in most of the real business cycle literature, we choose the time period to be a year rather than a quarter. This requires some adjustments to the representation of the process for the shocks.
The main reason for choosing a year as the period length in the baseline parameterization is that facilitates comparison with the results in Chari et al. (1994) , who also use a yearly model. The fact that they do is of course no coincidence; tax rates are typically adjusted no more often than annually in the United States. It is of course another matter whether a year corresponds closely to the lag between legislation and implementation. But even this is not so unreasonable. In any case, we perform a detailed sensitivity analysis with respect to the period length. Note that the length 8 We thank Per Krusell for his enlightening remarks on this point.
14 of the period is not necessarily related to the issue of the balanced budget rule. The former basically restricts the length of time before capital income taxes can be levied, while the latter restricts the ability to redistribute government revenue across time.
Preferences and technology
The functional forms are standard. The utility function is of the CRRA form (moreover in the baseline case we use log utility), and technology is Cobb-Douglas.
where A is a normalization parameter chosen so that output per period in the full commitment economies is 1 on average. Meanwhile, the average value of g is calibrated so that the equilibrium is such that government purchases are 20 % of output in the no commitment case as well. Of course, g remains a parameter beyond the control of the government in all cases.
Stochastic shocks
The process for the shocks are the taken to be independent two-state Markov chains both for g and for z. Moreover, they are symmetric, with mean .2 of GDP and 1, respectively. We calibrate the parameters for the z process so as to match the variance and autocorrelation reported in Prescott (1986) and the g process so as to match the moments reported in Jonsson and Klein (1997) .
The specific parameterization that we use is depicted in Table 1 . Table 2 shows the implied main statistics for the exogenous stochastic processes for productivity and government expenditures. As we see, lengthening the period reduces the standard deviation and the autocorrelation due to time averaging. For details, see the Appendix. z and the degree of intertemporal substitutability as measured by σ. We report below the sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameters. We discuss in section 6.3 the reasons why the quantitative properties are so dependent in both the length of the period and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Quantitative results
In order to provide a background against which to compare and contrast the quantitative properties of time-consistent fiscal policy, we begin by presenting the results for the commitment economy in section 6.1. In section 6.2 we proceed to present the main contribution of this paper: a quantitative characterization of optimal fiscal policy when the government cannot commit beyond the next period's capital income tax rate. In the next section, we describe the outcome of sensitivity analysis with respect to those parameters that turn out to matter, and explain why they matter. Finally, in sections 6.4 and 6.5, we trace the sources of the results in the previous sections by considering economies hit by one type of shock (government purchases or productivity) only.
Commitment
The key findings of the economy with commitment are depicted in Table 3 . We can summarize these findings as follows.
1. The capital income tax rate is close to zero on average.
The capital income tax rate is very volatile.
3. The ex-ante capital income tax rate, i.e. the conditionally expected value of next period's capital income tax rate given current information, with a standard deviation that is about one seventh of that of the ex-post tax rate.
4. The labor income tax rate is large in the sense that on average, the entire burden of taxation is borne by labor.
5. The labor income tax rate is very smooth.
6. The tax rates are negatively correlated with each other.
7. Both tax rates are countercyclical. (This is the outcome of the interaction with both shocks. Later we look at the relation with both shocks separately.)
These patterns are for the most part very similar to those described by Stockman (1998) even though the class of economies that he looked at are slightly different (he considers economies that grow and hold a constant yet positive amount of debt).
In general the properties that we found are also quite similar to those described in Chari et al. (1994) , with the exception, perhaps, of the fact that in their case the capital income tax rates are even more volatile which points to the role that the balanced budget constraint has in our economy. The rationale for this is clear: with positive autocorrelation the news are bigger than the value of the shocks, in the sense that the needs for financing are larger than the period increase in government expenditures. If the government could carry resources across periods, then it would tax more in the event of bad news to reduce the need for future taxation.
So to summarize, under commitment the burden of taxation is borne almost completely by labor while capital taxation accommodates all surprises.
No Commitment
The first column of Table 4 shows the key characteristics of taxes in the baseline economy without commitment. The differences with the commitment case are dramatic. A summary of those characteristics is 1. The tax rate on capital income is huge.
2. The capital income tax is quite but not too volatile. As measured by the standard deviation, the volatility of the capital income tax is only about two thirds as high in the economy without commitment.
3. Ex-ante capital income tax rates are about half as volatile as ex-post rates.
Compared to the commitment economy, however, they are much more volatile; 4. The tax rate on labor income is quite small; on average it is about a third of its level in the economy with commitment. This is not surprising, but also not obvious. For given levels of capital and hours worked, the higher capital income tax rate in the no commitment economy lowers the labor income tax rate required to balance the budget. However, general equilibrium effects could and presumably do partly offset this effect.
5. Labor income taxes are quite volatile, much more so than in the full commitment economy.
6. The tax rates are negatively correlated with each other as they were in the economy with commitment, only more strongly so.
7. Capital income tax rates are procyclical and labor income taxes are countercyclical. This is the general outcome of the interaction with both shocks. The same did not happen in the economy with commitment where both tax rates where countercyclical.
There are a few other important characteristics of the two model economies that differ. Mostly, they relate to the properties of the allocations, not the tax rates themselves.
They are 8. Output is much lower in the no commitment economy (about 85%) as a result of the high capital income tax rate that reduces the average amount of capital in the economy.
9. Output volatility is smaller in the no commitment economy. Not only as a result of the lower output, but also in terms of coefficients of variation (about 90% as volatile in relative terms).
10. Autocorrelation of output is also smaller in the economy without commitment (about 90% of that in the full commitment case). To summarize, the properties of capital and labor income taxes are very different under no commitment than under commitment.
To further show how different the two cases are, Figure 1 shows the dynamic adjustment of an economy where the government loses its ability to commit in the absence of stochastic shocks. In this case, g is held constant throughout, so the new steady state will not be such that government purchases are 20 percent of GDP; in fact they will be more, because output falls.
In particular, Figure 1 illustrates the paths for the capital stock, output, hours worked, and tax rates, starting from the long run situation under commitment, and then at period zero, this commitment is lost, so that capital income taxes can be changed starting in period 1. The figure shows the outcomes when all shocks are set constant and equal to their unconditional means.
What we see in Figure 1 is that anticipated increase in the capital income tax rate encourages people to choose high leisure and consumption in period zero. Thus hours plunge and the capital stock starts to fall. Since hours fall so much, the labor income tax required to balance the budget initially increases dramatically, but eventually falls below its initial level as hours recover and capital income tax revenues rise to a higher level. In the long run, output falls as a result of the lower capital stock, but in the short run it falls even more in response to the initial fall in hours. Figure 2 shows the converse, namely the path for the capital stock in an economy that has just gained access to a perfect commitment technology. As we mentioned in the introduction, this transition involves huge welfare gains. On a period-by-period basis, the gain corresponds to an increase in consumption of 5.2 percent. Translating the gain into a one-time payment, it turns out that an economy in the no-commitment steady state could afford to destroy 34 percent of its capital stock and still be no worse off if it only gained access to a commitment technology.
Figure 3 exhibits a sample path of the full commitment and of the no-commitment economies for identical realizations of the shocks. We can see that capital income tax rates and output move in the same direction in both economies (they respond to shocks in a qualitatively similar way) but that the magnitudes of the responses are 
What Matters
Obviously, changes in any of the parameters changes the quantitative answers that we obtain. For most of the parameters these changes are both predictable and small and we omit them for the sake of brevity. However there are two parameters that have dramatic implications for the quantitative findings. These are the elasticity of substitution and the length of the period. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is under our functional form assumption, the inverse of the coefficient of risk aversion. The value of this parameter only affects the quantitative properties of the economy without commitment, while it leaves essentially unchanged those of the full commitment economy. The intuition for this is as follows. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution determines the extent to which households will respond to a one-shot change in the ex-ante capital income tax rate by substituting consumption and leisure across time. A subtle aspect of this is that the response of current hours will determine the labor income tax rate that is required to balance the budget. Thus a higher capital income tax rate tomorrow requires a bigger distortion of the labor/leisure choice today.
If the response is large, this will act as a deterrent against levying high tax rates on capital income. Thus we should expect a higher capital income tax rate the higher is σ, since 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The role of the length of the period is, perhaps, more obvious since a longer period means (given our setup) a greater degree of commitment for the government. In the economy with commitment the properties of optimal taxation barely change at all when we vary both parameters. Table 4 shows the properties of the tax rates and allocations for the model economies for different values of the length of the period and for an economy with a low elasticity of substitution (the high σ economy where periods are set to mean years). The most striking properties are the following.
1. The tax rate on capital income is much higher in economies with low commitment and with low intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Increasing the length of the period results in a substantial decrease of the capital income tax rate and in an increase in the labor income tax rate. A low elasticity of substitution implies lower reductions in work effort and savings for any given capital income tax rate tomorrow which reduces the cost of taxing capital and hence increases the willingness of the government to use capital taxation.
2. The volatility of capital income taxes in terms of standard deviations is not affected much by the length of the period. It is very much affected, however, by the elasticity of substitution. The low elasticity of substitution economy has up to four times the standard deviation of capital income tax rates.
3. The volatility of labor income taxes in terms of standard deviations is decreasing the length of the period. In the low elasticity of substitution economy is huge.
4. In terms of the properties of output, low elasticity of substitution economies have a huge volatility, about double that of the baseline case, it also has a lower autocorrelation.
To summarize, longer periods make the no commitment economy look more like the full commitment economy, while a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution exacerbates the problems induced by lack of commitment as it makes work effort and savings inelastic with respect to future income tax rates.
Government expenditure shocks only
Next, we turn to the properties of the tax rates when there is only one source of fluctuations. main properties that we saw for the case with both shocks simultaneously. The key properties that we see are once more the high capital and low labor taxes without commitment, the lower standard deviation of capital income taxation and the higher standard deviation of labor income taxes under no commitment, even though overall capital income tax rates are more volatile than labor income tax rates are. Finally, note that under commitment labor income tax rates are negatively correlated with the shock while with no commitment this correlation is small and positive.
The upper panel of Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of the no commitment economy in response to shocks to government purchases. We may confirm that output, capital income tax rates and government purchases move together.
The lower panel of Figure 4 shows the dynamics of the full commitment economy in response to shocks to government purchases. As in the no commitment economy, output, capital income taxes and government purchases move together, but the labor income tax is much flatter.
Comparing the two panels, we see that output responds much more to the government purchases shocks in the no commitment economy than it does in the full commitment economy. Indeed, as measured by the coefficient of variation, output is about three times more volatile in the former than the latter (1.7 percent versus 0.6 percent). with both shocks simultaneously: that there are high capital and low labor taxes without commitment, and the lower standard deviation of capital income taxation and the higher labor income standard deviation under no commitment. With respect to the correlations structure, note that under commitment labor income tax rates are mildly negatively correlated with productivity while with no commitment this correlation is sizable and positive.
Productivity shocks only
The upper panel of Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics of the no commitment economy in response to technology shocks, and the lower panel of Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics of the full commitment economy in response to productivity shocks. Qualitatively, the responses are similar; quantitatively, the responses of tax rates are larger in the no commitment economy.
However, looking at output we have the reverse result of the economy that is subject to shocks to government expenditures only. With shocks only to productivity, output is less volatile in the no commitment economy; the coefficient of variation is just 0.033 as compared to 0.040 in the full commitment economy. Recall that the overall effect of the lack of commitment versus is to make output less volatile, about 10% less volatile.
Constitutional Differences
We now turn to describe how small changes in the constitutional design can and do have large implications for the policies chosen. Consider an alternative environment which is like the one we have considered so far in that the government is subject to a balanced budget rule, but that instead of inheriting a commitment from the previous government to a capital income tax rate, suppose it inherits a commitment to a labor income tax rate. The capital income tax is then whatever it has to be to balance the budget, and the government's current period choice variable is next period's labor income tax rate.
The issue is whether this arrangement is the same as the one we have studied so far. In a static model, the answer is yes. The government has to balance the budget and has one instrument to do so, so it has no degrees of freedom.
In a dynamic context, things are very different. By choosing one of tomorrow's tax rates, the government affects today's incentives to save and work. But this means that it can indirectly affect the current tax rate (the one that it does not inherit), because current labor input and prices determine what tax rate is required today in order to balance the budget. These indirect effects are an essential part of the incentives that the current government faces and the opportunities it has for manipulating its successor.
Moreover, the mechanics of these indirect effects are very different depending on what tax it is that is inherited. If the government inherits a capital income tax rate, then its choice of tomorrow's capital income tax rate will affect the rate of return on postponing consumption and leisure. For the sake of argument, say it is considering an increase in the capital income tax rate. Such an increase will reduce incentives to work today, thus increasing the labor tax rate that is required to balance the budget. Since the labor tax rate is distortive, this is a fairly powerful deterrent against prohibitively high capital income tax rates.
With labor income tax rates being inherited from the past (and chosen for the future), the corresponding deterrent is absent. When contemplating a lower labor income tax rate tomorrow (and hence a higher capital income tax rate tomorrow), the government still has to take into account that this reduces incentives to work today. But in this setting, that means that the current capital income tax has to increase in order to balance the budget, and the current capital income tax is not distortive, since it is levied on a factor that is inelastically supplied from today's point of view.
These considerations suggest that capital income tax rates should be higher in the economy where labor income taxes are inherited (and chosen for the next period) than in the economy where the capital income tax plays these roles. This is indeed the case. In the baseline economy, the steady state capital income tax is 77 percent (as compared to 65 percent in the economy where the capital income tax is the state variable).
This shows the large quantitative importance of seemingly minor constitutional details.
